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class of property owners at the expense of all the taxpayers.32 If the
answer is in the negative, the abutting owner's rights will only be
another of those individual rights which have been curtailed for the
benefit of the state.
JOHN P. PEoTD
BASIS OF LIABILITY IN FIREWORKS ACCIDENTS
In tort actions where injuries are sustained by alleged mishandling
of fireworks, compulsory nonsuits should be entered in Pennsylvania
only when it is clear that the party or parties suing have failed to
prove their case, and only when they have had the benefit of all the
evidence and inferences favorable to their cause of action.' The ques-
tion of whether a compulsory nonsuit should be lifted when the evi-
dence was insufficient to present a question for the jury was the sub-
ject of a recent appellate case of first impression in Pennsylvania.
Haddon v. Lotito2 was an action for personal injuries suffered at a
fireworks display produced by the defendant at a public park. The
plaintiffs visited the park to see the fireworks display and stood with
other spectators approximately one thousand feet away from where
the fireworks were set off. Testimony revealed that some of the rock-
ets failed to reach sufficient height and fell into the crowd where they
exploded injuring the plaintiffs. 3 The trial court held that the plain-
tiffs had failed to make a prima facie case as to the defendant's negli-
gence, and entered a nonsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed that de-
cision, with two judges dissenting 4
32Levin, Federal Aspects of the Interstate Highway Program, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 377
(1959). This article gives a view of the tremendous amount of money needed to
carry out this program on the federal-state cooperation level.
2Borzik- v. Miller, 399 Pa. 293, 159 A.2d 471 (196o); Taylor v. Philadelphia
Parking Authority, 398 Pa. 9, 156 A.2d 525 (1959); Gift v. Palmer, 392 Pa. 628, 141
A.2d 4o8 (1958); Schofield v. King, 388 Pa. 132, 13o A.2d 93 (1957); Finnin v. Neubert,
378 Pa. 40, io5 A.2d 77 (1954).
2399 Pa. 521, 161 A.2d x6o (196o).
Id. at 163. One of the plaintiffs testified, " '[T]hey [the rockets] just thumped
and busted all over and some of them hit the ground in among us and busted ....
Some of them, instead of going away up ... they just went up a little way, part way
up, and then they came right back down and started busting among us .... They
seemed to be getting lower and lower instead of staying high .... Some of them
already hit in front of us on the ground and people were hollering and crying and
screaming. Finally, someone yelled, Run: they are going to hit the ground'."
rId. at 164. Judge Musmanno, writing the dissenting opinion in which Judge Bok
concurred, stated that: "A person who is invited to a pyrotechnical performance
has the right to expect that he will not be shot at with Roman candles, that sky
CASE COMMENTS
The dissenting judges felt that the nonsuit should have been lifted
and the defendant held accountable. They drew an analogy between
the injuries suffered in the present case and those of an innocent
pedestrian who is knocked down by an automobile. In the latter
situation the fact that the automobile was where it had no right to be
would place upon the driver the burden of explaining how and why
the accident occurred.
The plaintiffs maintained that the defendant's liability could be
based on any one of three theories: (i) absolute liability; (2) exclu-
sive control; and (3) direct proof of negligence.
If the doctrine of absolute liability is applicable the defendant is
liable for any harm that results from an ultrahazardous activity, even
though the utmost care has been exercised.5 This doctrine has gen-
erally been applied to activities such as blasting.6 Most of the juris-
dictions which have considered whether the doctrine extends to fire-
works exhibitions have denied absolute liability by requiring some
positive proof of negligence.7 Other jurisdictions have imposed ab-
solute liability, but in each case the fireworks display was either il-
legal or in the nature of a nuisance.8 Therefore, the majority in the
instant case was justified in denying recovery to the appellants on a
theory of absolute liability. Pennsylvania has adopted the view of the
rockets will not drop on his head, that aerial bombs will not explode under his
feet and that pin wheels will not roll to his immediate vicinity and there revolve
to his disaster." The dissenting judges would therefore have held the defendant
legally accountable because, "it is actionable negligence so to fire bombs that they
will fall on a spectator standing where he is expected to stand to view a display of
fireworks." Id. at 165. These words first appeared in the case of Sroka v. Halliday,
39 R.I. 119, 97 At. 965 at 974 (igi6), wherein a minor was injured when he found
an unexploded bomb and brought it to his home where it exploded. The court felt
that it was a question for the jury whether the defendants took the necessary pre-
cautions to prevent injury to persons and property when they permitted the un-
exploded bombs to fall and remain unrecovered until found by a child.
zSee note 9 infra; Restatement, Torts § 519 (1938).
rFederoff v. Harrison Constr. Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949). Restatement,
Torts § 520, comment c. (1938).
-Waixel v. Harrison, 37 Ill. App. 323 (189o); Blue Grass Fair Ass'n v. Bunnell,
2o6 Ky. 462, 267 S.W. 237 (1924) ; Shannon v. Dow, 133 Me. 235, 175 At. 766 (1934);
Colvin v. Peabody, 155 Mass. 104, 29 N.E. 59 (i8gi); Dowell v. Guthrie, 99 Mo. 653,
12 S.W. goo (1890); Bianki v. Greater Am. Exposition Co., 92 N.W. 615 (Neb. 1902);
Robinson v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co., 104 N.J.L. 589, 141 At. 802 (1928); Crowley v.
Rochester Fireworks Co., 183 N.Y. 353, 76 N.E. 470 (19o6); Sroka v. Halliday, 39
R.I. 11t9 , 97 Adt. 965 (i9i6).
OGerrard v. Porcheddu, 243 11. App. 562 (1927) ; Moore v. City of Bloomington,
51 Ind. App. 145, 95 N.E. 374 (1911); Doughty v. Atlantic City Business League,
79 N.J. Eq. 165, 8o Atl. 473 (igi); Landau v. City of New York, i8o N.Y. 48, 72
N.E. 631 (1904); Harris v. City of Findlay, 59 Ohio App. 375, 18 N.E.2d 413 (1938).
i96i]
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Restatement of Torts, called the ultrahazardous activity approach,9
Although this rule was not accepted in that state without some con-
troversy.10
The second theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiffs was that
of exclusive control, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also held
inapplicable. The exclusive control doctrine is "more or less peculiar
to Pennsylvania in accident cases."" It is a first cousin of the more
traditional doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,12 which in Pennsylvania is
restricted to situations in which there is a contract between the
parties.'3 The exclusive control doctrine was first adopted in Shafer
v. Lacock,' 4 when the court said:
"The accident, the injury, and the circumstances under which
they occurred, are in some cases sufficient to raise a presump-
tion of negligence, and thus cast on the defendant the burden
of establishing his freedom from fault. WNhen the thing which
causes the injury is shown to be under the management of de-
fendants, and the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use
gRestatement, Torts § 519 (1938): "Except as stated in § 521-4, one who carries
on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels
the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage
of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultra-
hazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm."
Restatement, Torts.§ 520 (1938): "An activity is ultrahazardous if it (a) neces-
sarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of
common usage."
"The three recognized rules of law which are applicable to situations involving
liability for the escape of substances from land are (1) the English rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R. i Ex. 265, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), (2) the absolute nuisance doctrine,
and (3) the Restatement rule.
Pennsylvania has specifically rejected the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.
Waschak v. Moffat, 397 Pa. 441, iog A.2d 310 (1954); Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939); Venzel v. Valley Camp Coal Co.,
304 Pa. 583, 156 At. 240 (1931); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126,
6 Ad. 453 (1886). In place of the rule of Rvlands v. Fletcher the court applied
the absolute nuisance doctrine. Venzel v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 3o4 Pa. 583, 156
Ad. 240 (1931); Householder v. Quemahoning Coal Co., 272 Pa. 78, 116 Atl. 40 (1922);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453 (1886).
Pennsylvania's acceptance of the Restatement rule is best described in WVaschak
v. Moffatt, 379 Pa. 441, iog A.2d 31o (1954). See generally, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 781
(1947)-
"Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 , 453 ('953).
2Kotal v. Goldberg, 375 Pa. 397, ioo A.2d 630, 636 (1953).
UDXLch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953); Maltz v. Carter, 311 Pa.
550, x66 Atl. 852 (1933). See also, Sierocinski v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co..
118 F.2d 531 (3 d Cir. 1941).
24168 Pa. 497, 32 Ad. 44 (1895).
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proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from
want of care."'1
The doctrine has been applied to many varying factual situa-
tions,16 but more recently it has been restricted17 and not given as
broad an interpretation as the Shafer case indicated. This observa-
tion is borne out by the 1953 case of Kotal v. Goldberg,8 in which
Judge Bell in a concurring opinion enumerated all the elements nec-
essary to invoke the exclusive control doctrine. First, the thing that
caused the accident must have been under the defendant's control or
manufactured by him, and the situation must have been such that the
accident would not have occurred if the defendant had exercised
due care. Secondly, the evidence as to the cause of the accident must
have been within the possession of the defendant and not equally
available to both parties. Thirdly, the accident itself must have been
unusual, and finally, the facts must be such that general principles
of negligence are not applicable.' 9
When applicable, the effect of this doctrine is to place upon the
defendant the burden of rebutting an inference of negligence. 20 Sub-
sequent cases show that the literal interpretation of the doctrine as
first applied in Shafer v. Lacock2' has been restricted to those situa-
tions in which the accident is unusual, the defendant is peculiarly
or exclusively22 in possession of the evidence of its cause, and the ac-
cident is of such a nature that it probably would not have occurred
unless negligence existed.23 The court held in the instant case that all
the requirements necessary for application of the exclusive control
doctrine were not met since the accident could just as well have been
caused by latent defects in the fireworks themselves.
"'Id. at 46.
"nMack v. Reading Co., 377 Pa. 135, 103 A.2d 749 (1954); Loch v. Confair, 372
Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953); Commonwealth v. Montour Transp. Co., 365 Pa. 72,
73 A.2d 659 (195o); Skeen v. Stanley Co., 362 Pa. 174, 66 A.2d 774 (1949); Durning
v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 133 At. 568 (1926); East End Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Tor-
pedo Co., 19o Pa. 350, 42 Ad. 707 (1899); Shafer v. Lacock, 168 Pa. 497, 32 Ad. 44
(1895); Cross v. Laboda, i9o Pa. Super. iig, x52 A.2d 792 (1959); Dillon v. Williams
S. Scull Co., 164 Pa. Super. 365, 64 A.2d 525 (1949).
"7Kotal v. Goldberg, 375 Pa. 397, oo A.2d 630 (1953); Ebersole v. Beistline,
368 Pa. 12, 82 A.2d 1' (1951); Miller v. Hickey, 368 Pa. 317, 81 A.2d 910 (ig5i);
Martin v. Marateck, 345 Pa. 103, 27 A.2d 42 (1942); Veneziale v. Carr, 191 Pa. Super.
30, 155 A.2d 638 (1959).
18375 Pa. 397, ioo A.2d 630 (1953).
"Id. at 641.
"Mack v. Reading, supra note 16.
2168 Pa. 497, 32 Ad. 44 (1895).
"Kotal v. Goldberg, supra note 19.
=Ibid.
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The rejection of the exclusive control doctrine did not preclude the
plaintiffs from employing a general negligence theory, and the court's
rejection of his first two grounds of recovery forced him to proceed
upon this theory. Under general rules of negligence, unlike in the
absolute liability and exclusive control theories, the happening of
the accident is no indication of the defendant's negligence because
negligence is never presumed from the mere happening of an acci-
dent.24 To avoid liability the defendant must use the care of a rea-
sonably prudent man under like circumstances to protect spectators
from injury.25 As stated in the Missouri case of Dowell v. Guthrie,26
"Where the injury is unintentional, and is inflicted in the doing of a
lawful act, there can be no recovery.., except by showing negligence
on the part of the defendant; and the burden of proof ... is upon the
plaintiff."27 In that case the defendants were found to have been
smoking cigars near a large quantity of fireworks which exploded
and injured the plaintiff. The court held in the Dowell case that the
carelessness in the defendants' handling of the fireworks was sufficient
to let the case go to the jury.2s Other jurisdictions permit this type
of case to go to the jury only after the plaintiff has shown his own due
care as well as some evidence of the defendant's negligence.2 How-
ever, it seems obvious that one handling fireworks or dangerous ex-
plosives must exercise a higher standard of care than that required
in normal activities. 3 0 In Deyo v. Kingston Consol. Ry. 31 the court held
that the defendant was under a duty to prohibit spectators from com-
ing close when it was known or should have been known that a dan-
gerous condition existed.32 Moreover, it has been held to be a jury
*A Gift v. Palmer, 392 Pa. 628, 141 A.2d 4o8 (1958); Schofield v. King, 388 Pa.
132, 13o A.2d 93 (1957); Brusis v. Henkels, 376 Pa. 226, 102 A.2d 146 (1954); Finnin
v. Neubert, 378 Pa. 40, 1o5 A.2d 77 (1954); Lanni v. Pennsylvania R.R., 371 Pa. io6,
88 A.2d 887 (1952).
'Ibid. See also, Sebeck v. Plattdeutsche Volkfest Verein, 64 N.J.L. 624, 46 AtI.
631 (0oo).
"99 Mo. 653, 12 S.W. 900 (1890).
2]d. at 902.
"The court also said, "The discharge of fireworks at suitable places, when not
prohibited by statute or municipal regulations, cannot be said to be unlawful;
but the circumstances may be such as to make the act of discharging an explosive
culpable negligence." Id. at 9O1.
"Colvin v. Peabody, 155 Mass. 104, 29 N.E. 59 (1891); Dowell v. Guthrie, 99
Mo. 653, 12 S.W. goo (189o); Robinson v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co., 1o4 N.J.L. 589,
141 Atl. 8o2 (1928); Crowley v. Rochester Fireworks Co., 183 N.Y. 353, 76 N.E. 470
(igo6).
3'Bianki v. Greater Am. Exposition Co., 92 NAV. 615, 617 (Neb. 1902).
m% App. Div. 578, 88 N.Y.S. 487 (3 d Dep't 19o4).
321d. at 490.
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question "whether the exhibition was properly segregated from the
spectators, and whether the explosives were of such a character as
to render them intrinsically dangerous considering the manner in
which they were intended to be used."33 In the New Jersey case of
Sebeck v. Plattdeutsche Volkfest Verein34 involving facts similar to
those in the instant case, the court held that the defendant was not re-
lieved from liability because he hired an independent contractor to
set off the display. "Having invited the public to its park, it was
chargeable with the duty of using reasonable care to see that the
premises were kept in a safe condition for the use of its guests." 35
From the evidence presented in that case the court concluded that
the defendant did everything possible to make the area safe, thereby
relieving himself from liability. Similarly, it was held in Reisman v.
Public Serv. Corp.36 that the management of an exhibition is not
negligent when the only further precaution he could have taken
would have been to place the spectators too far away to observe proper-
ly the display.37 The court pointed out that in the Sebeck case the
spectators were only one hundred feet from the exhibition while in
Reisman the spectators were three to four hundred feet away. These
two New Jersey decisions indicate that the defendant in the principal
case was not negligent, in as much as the plaintiffs were approxi-
mately one thousand feet away from the exhibiting area.
38
There was nothing in the situation to give rise to a suspicion
that the fireworks were likely to cause injury, and the defendant may
be said to have used reasonable care to keep the spectators away from
the exhibition area. If a barrier had been erected to protect the
plaintiffs from an occurrence such as this, the object of the display
"Blue Grass Fair Ass'n v. Bunnell, 2o6 Ky. 462, 267 S.V. 237, 240 (1924).
3464 N.J.L. 624, 46 AtI. 631 (igoo). This case was also brought in the federal
courts subsequent to the nonsuit by the New Jersey Court of Appeals. The case
reached the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upon a writ of error to review a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. Sebeck v. Plattdeutsche Volkfest Verein, 124
Fed. ii (2d Cir. 19o3), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 634 (19o4). The federal court reviewed
the trial court's instructions to the jury and sustained them. "Under those circum-
stances it was incumbent upon the defendant to use the care and prudence which
would have been exercised by an ordinary prudent and intelligent man to protect
him, and to protect the others who were there, from unnecessary risks." Id. at 14,
quoting with approval an instruction given in the District Court. Plaintiff's conten-
tion that defendant owed a higher duty than ordinary care was overruled and he
was nonsuited again.
364 N.J.L. 624, 46 Atl. 631, 632 (1900).
-82 N.J.L. 464, 81 Atl. 838 (1911).
'Id. at 839.
T Haddon v. Lotito, 399 Pa. 521, 161 A.2d 16o, 163 (196o).
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would have been largely defeated.39 The majority of the court there-
fore decided that there was insufficient evidence to show defen-
dant's negligence, even when the plaintiffs were given the benefit of
all favorable inferences. When the plaintiff failed to prove the de-
fendant's lack of due care, he subjected himself to a nonsuit.
Although it was not necessary to its decision, the court mentioned
the problem presented by the doctrine of assumption of the risk
as applied to the plaintiffs. In the case of Scanlon v. Wedger-° it was
said that "a voluntary spectator, who is present merely for the pur-
pose of witnessing the display, must be held to consent to it, and he
suffers no legal wrong if accidentally. injured without negligence on
the part of anyone, although the show was unauthorized. He takes the
risk."41 There was a strong dissent in the ScanIon case which consider-
ably weakens the decision. In the majority of cases dealing with in-
juries from fireworks, the contention that the injured party assumed
the risk has been rejected as a matter of law.
42
It appears that Pennsylvania has adopted a conservative approach
as to the applicability of the doctrines of absolute liability, exclusive
control, and assumption of risk in cases involving injuries sustained
by spectators at fireworks displays. In that jurisdiction the situation
is governed under general negligence theories, and the plaintiff's
failure to carry the burden of proving the defendant's lack of due care
will result in an involuntary nonsuit.
LAURENCE M. SMAIL
2OSebeck v. Plattdeutsche Volkfest Verein, 64 N.J.L. 624, 46 At. 631, 632 (0oo).
4'156 Mass. 462, 31 N.E. 642 (1892).
"Ibid. But see, Annot. 24 A.L.R. 766 (1923).
"2Moore v. Bloomington, 51 Ind. App. 145, 95 N.E. 374 (1911); Colvin v. Peabody,
155 Mass. 104, 29 N.E. 59 (i8qi); Dowell v. Guthrie, 99 Mo. 653, 12 SAV. 900 (1890).
